Sergey Vakulenko is an energy analyst currently based in Berlin, where he serves as a Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Centre. Prior to this, he spent more than a decade (2011–2022) as Head of Strategy and Innovations at Gazprom Neft, one of Russia’s key state-aligned oil companies. [1: https://www.tek-all.ru/news/id9140-rukovoditel-departamenta-strategii-i-innovatsiy-pao-gazprom-neft-sergey-vakulenko-pokinul-neftyanuu-kompaniu/
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He worked under CEO Alexander Dyukov and alongside Andrey Patrushev, both sanctioned in 2022 for their roles within the Russian governing system and its war against Ukraine. [2: https://www.opensanctions.org/entities/Q859265/
] [3: https://www.opensanctions.org/entities/NK-e7prz2oDCB77Rym9STiQkF
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Today, Vakulenko continues to operate from a Western analytical platform with significant visibility in policy and media discussions. Crucially, the analytical report by Razom We Stand (see link at the end) shows that his messaging did not shift after leaving Russia. Instead, the same narratives he expressed while inside Gazprom Neft have continued in Western discourse, now with greater legitimacy and reach.
Russian-linked background and relevance
Vakulenko was directly involved in designing Gazprom Neft’s response to sanctions after the 2014 annexation of Crimea, including participation in the Skolkovo Energy Centre report on how Russian oil production adapted through import substitution and non-Western partnerships. [4: https://energy.skolkovo.ru/downloads/documents/SEneC/research04-ru.pdf
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This fact is critical. He is not an external analyst. He is a former architect of sanctions resilience, now analyzing those same sanctions from within a Western think tank.
That combination continues to shape his current work. Rather than identifying vulnerabilities in Russia’s energy model or enforcement gaps, he consistently emphasizes:
the adaptability of Russian exports;
the limits of sanctions;
the risks and costs for Western policymakers.
This pattern persists through 2026.
Ongoing narrative alignment with Kremlin positions
Vakulenko’s alignment with Kremlin narratives is not confined to early post-invasion commentary. It continues across multiple years and publications.
Already before the invasion, in October 2021, he dismissed claims that Russia weaponized gas supply as “myths” promoted by Ukraine and Western actors. [5: https://www.finversia.ru/obsor/blogs/sergei-vakulenko-gazprom-i-gazovyi-krizis-102623
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After 2022, this narrative evolved but did not change direction.
In May 2022, he argued that sanctions on Russian energy would significantly harm Europe, reinforcing Putin’s claim that abandoning Russian energy amounted to “economic suicide.” [6: https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2022/05/shots-fired-is-an-eu-russia-energy-war-inevitable
] [7: https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2022/5/17/putin-europes-russia-sanctions-tantamount-to-economic-suicide
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This framing continues in his later work. In 2023–2024, Vakulenko repeatedly warned that stronger enforcement measures against Russian oil exports would be dangerous or escalatory. In Financial Times and Carnegie publications, he argued that targeting Russia-linked tankers or ports could constitute acts of war. [8: https://www.ft.com/content/61a0ef82-cca7-4791-8fa2-efa95a8e530e
] [9: https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2024/07/naval-blockade-russia-oil?lang=en
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This mirrors Russian diplomatic messaging. Russian UN representatives described similar enforcement actions as illegal and escalatory. [10: https://www.courthousenews.com/pressure-builds-in-baltic-sea-as-eu-targets-russias-shadow-fleet-of-oil-tankers
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In 2024–2025, his messaging further evolved into normalizing Russian sanctions evasion mechanisms.
In September 2024, he downplayed concerns about the shadow fleet, arguing it was not fundamentally different from the broader tanker market. [11: https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2024/10/russia-oil-fleet-sanctions
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This directly contradicts extensive independent research documenting safety, legal, and sanctions risks associated with shadow fleet operations. [12: https://energyandcleanair.org/publication/policy-briefing-tackling-the-russian-shadow-fleet
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In November 2024, he essentially dismissed research by KSE and CREA as propaganda and argued that global markets still require Russian oil. [13: https://republic.ru/posts/114210
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In early 2025, he continued warning that targeting buyers such as India or China would destabilize markets without reducing Russian exports. [14: https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2025/04/usa-trump-tariffs-russia-oil
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Evidence of ongoing non-neutrality
The report “Fueling Russia’s Oil and Gas Influence in Europe” highlights a consistent pattern that continues to this day:
Analytical asymmetry: detailed focus on Western risks, minimal discussion of benefits, such as reducing war funding;
Selective sourcing: little to no engagement with Ukrainian or pro-enforcement research;
Delegitimization of critics: labeling independent studies essentially as manipulative or propaganda;
Normalization of Russian resilience: presenting sanctions circumvention as inevitable or acceptable.
Vakulenko’s ongoing media and public interventions are not isolated or occasional. It is a sustained approach visible across multiple years and platforms.
Vakulenko repeatedly exaggerates Western costs and risks while downplaying strategic gains from curbing Russian revenues. He normalizes Russian resilience, treats legal or coercive action against oil exports as irresponsible escalation, and minimizes the shadow fleet’s environmental and sanctions evasion danger. He does not seriously engage Ukrainian evidence or pro-enforcement proposals. Instead, he depicts those critics warning about Russian leverage as politicized or propagandistic. That is not balanced expertise. It is narrative advocacy for Moscow’s preferred outcome.
Conclusion
Vakulenko should be classified as a propagandist under the criteria of Putin’s List, not only because of past conduct but because his active role continues today.
From his current position in a Western think tank, he continues to:
frame sanctions against Russian oil and gas as ineffective or dangerous;
legitimize Russian oil flows and circumvention mechanisms;
amplify narratives aligned with Kremlin positions.
His work does not merely coincide with Kremlin’s narratives. It systematically reinforces them in ongoing policy debates, providing them with analytical credibility and Western institutional cover.
This short profile note is based on the analytical report “Fueling Russia’s Oil and Gas Influence in Europe” from the Ukrainian NGO Razom We Stand, which covered info-operations of Vakulenko in detail, see Part 4 and annex: https://razomwestand.com/new-report-fuelling-russias-oil-and-gas-influence-in-europe/
Also see a publication in Ukrainian press: https://24tv.ua/menedzher-gazpromu-sergiy-vakulenko-pratsyuye-berlini-shirit_n3012717