Katja Yafimava is a Senior Research Fellow at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, where she has worked since 2006 within the Gas Programme. [1: https://www.oxfordenergy.org/authors/katja-yafimava/
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She remains active today in both academic and international policy platforms. As of March 2026, she serves as Vice Chair of the UNECE Group of Experts on Gas. [2: https://unece.org/sites/default/files/2025-05/OIES-UNECE%20workshop%20presentations_0.pdf
; https://unece.org/sed/documents/2025/04/presentations/european-gas-markets-building-resilience-amidst-transition
]
This positioning is critical. It places her at the intersection of:
Western academic discourse;
international regulatory platforms;
ongoing policy debates on gas markets and sanctions.
Her influence is therefore not historical. It is current and institutionalized.
Institutional and Russian-linked context
Yafimava’s long-term affiliation with OIES is central to understanding her influence. The institute’s Gas Programme has historically received sponsorship from Gazprom, Gazprom Marketing and Trading, and companies involved in Nord Stream projects. [3: https://www.oxfordenergy.org/sponsors
] [4: https://www.oxfordenergy.org/about/benefactors
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While OIES formally maintains research independence, the report emphasizes that:
sponsors receive access, visibility, and engagement opportunities;
institutional incentives align with industry perspectives;
long-term funding relationships shape research environments.
Yafimava’s work and media engagements must therefore be assessed in this context of sustained structural linkage to Russian gas interests.
Ongoing narrative alignment with Russian gas interests
Yafimava’s alignment with Russian narratives is not episodic. It is continuous from pre-2022 to the present.
Before the invasion:
In 2017, she defended Gazprom’s exclusive access to the OPAL pipeline and dismissed EU objections as political. [5: https://www.oxfordenergy.org/publications/the-opal-exemption-decision-can-it-be-withdrawn-and-if-so-by-whom/
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In 2019, she criticized EU Gas Directive changes as politically motivated against Nord Stream 2. [6: https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Gas-Directive-Amendment-Insight-49.pdf
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In 2020, she predicted Nord Stream 2 would be completed despite US sanctions and that the US would not be able to stop the project. [7: https://ria.ru/20201130/ssha-1586885234.html
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These positions aligned closely with Gazprom and Kremlin messaging at the time.
After 2022, the same pattern continues. At the time, Yafimava’s messaging closely mirrored Kremlin narratives by emphasizing that rapid cuts to Russian gas would cause severe shortages, blackouts, and economic disruption in Europe (this never became true), thereby reinforcing Moscow’s claim that Europe could not realistically abandon Russian energy without severe consequences. [8: https://www.eolasmagazine.ie/the-potential-impact-of-the-disruption-in-russian-gas-supplies-to-europe
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In the post-invasion period, her work conitnued toward questioning the feasibility of ending Russian gas dependence.
In 2025, she published analysis of the EU proposal to ban Russian gas imports, emphasizing legal, economic, and implementation challenges and framing the policy as more problematic than practical. [9: https://www.oxfordenergy.org/publications/the-eu-proposal-to-ban-russian-gas-imports-roadblock-more-than-roadmap/
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This reflects a broader pattern identified in the analytical report “Fueling Russia’s Oil and Gas Influence in Europe” from Razom We Stand:
focus on costs and risks of sanctions;
limited attention to strategic benefits;
reinforcement of the idea that abandoning Russian gas is unrealistic.
Influence through international platforms
Yafimava’s influence is amplified through her continued participation in international structures and policy debates.
At UNECE, where she became Vice Chair in March 2025, she operates within a platform that the report identifies as a key channel for legitimizing Russian-aligned narratives.
Her presentations and engagement in these forums continue to:
frame Russian gas as structurally important;
emphasize affordability and technical constraints;
avoid centering the geopolitical and war-financing dimensions.
This allows Kremlin-compatible narratives to enter international policy discussions under the label of neutral expertise.
Evidence of ongoing non-neutrality
Analysis of Yafimava’s commentary, publications, and media engagements identifies a consistent pattern that remains active:
Long-term narrative continuity: positions aligned with Gazprom before and after the invasion;
Analytical asymmetry: focus on obstacles to sanctions rather than benefits;
Selective framing: prioritization of market and legal arguments over security considerations;
Platform leverage: use of respected academic and UN-linked structures.
Yafimava’s work does not seriously incorporate Ukrainian perspectives and habitually privileges commercial, legal, and market continuity arguments over the security and war-financing dimensions. In other words, the asymmetry is not accidental. It has been sustained over many years and across multiple institutional settings.
Crucially, this is not a past phenomenon. These patterns continue in her current publications and institutional roles.
Conclusion
Yafimava should be classified as a propagandist under Putin’s List criteria, not because of isolated statements, but because of long-sustained, ongoing strategic influence.
From her current positions at OIES and UNECE, she continues to:
promote narratives aligned with Russian gas interests;
question the feasibility and effectiveness of sanctions;
normalize continued reliance on Russian energy.
Her influence operates through respected Western and international platforms, giving Kremlin-compatible narratives legitimacy and durability in ongoing policy debates.
This is not historical alignment. It is an active, present-day narrative reinforcement within Western institutions.
This profile note is based on the analytical report of the Ukrainian NGO Razom We Stand, “Fueling Russia’s Oil and Gas Influence in Europe”, which covered operations of Yafimava in detail; see Part 4 and annex: https://razomwestand.com/new-report-fuelling-russias-oil-and-gas-influence-in-europe/
Also see a publication from the Ukrainian press: https://24tv.ua/yak-rosiya-vikoristovuye-naukovtsiv-dlya-lobiyuvannya-gazovih_n3004403